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SUING ON BREACH OF CONTRACT UNDER
WRONGFUL DEATH ACT
Zoestautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hospital
23 111. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303 (1961)
Plaintiffs, as mother and father, sued defendant surgeon for the death
of their son. Count IV of their petition, alleging a breach of express con-
tract by the surgeon,1 was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a
cause of action. The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the trial court's dis-
missal because count IV referred to a common-law contract action separate
from the Wrongful Death Act, and was barred by the death of the patient.
However, it also held that a breach of a physician's contract resulting in the
death of the patient may constitute a "default" within the terms of the
Illinois Wrongful Death Act.2
The court based its decision on a survey of United States case law which
revealed that there was some authority for a surviving patient to base an
action against his physician on breach of contract. 3 Secondly, the court held
that to allow a distinction between tort and contract actions would create
inconsistencies which would be unjust,4 and would continue the old formal-
ized method of pleading which most states have abolished. The court also
held that a breach of a physician's contract resulting in the death of a
patient constitutes a default, and put considerable emphasis on the fact
that the Illinois Wrongful Death Act included the word default5 which was
defined as "the non-performance of a duty whether arising out of a con-
tract or otherwise."6
Actions based on contract under wrongful death acts have been ac-
cepted in only a few jurisdictions. As early as 1917, Minnesota allowed a
wrongful death action based on contract due to a landlord's failure to perform
a contract to keep leased premises heated. 7 New York has gone the furthest
1 Count IV of the petition alleged that defendant surgeon expressly contracted to
perform a tonsillectomy on plaintiff's son with the degree of care which physicians
and surgeons of ordinary skill, care, and diligence would exercise under the circumstances,
and that defendant breached his contract by treating plaintiff's son in a careless man-
ner directly resulting in his death.
2 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 70, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959).
3 Calamari v. Mary Immaculate Hosp., 3 Misc. 2d 780, 155 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Sup.
Ct. 1956); Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hosp., 96 Misc. 289, 160 N.Y.S. 401 (Sup. Ct.
1916), aff'd, 176 App. Div. 885, 161 N.Y.S. 1143 (1916).
4 Zoestautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 23 Ill. 2d 326, 334, 178 N.E.2d 303,
307 (1961): ". .. [Ilt would permit complete recovery for death caused by the breach
of a contract duty, while denying all recovery for death caused by the breach of a
duty imposed by law."
5 IIl. Ann. Stat. ch. 70, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959): "Wherever the death of a person
shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default. .. ."
6 1 Bouvier Law Dictionary 814 (Rawle's 3d rev. 1914).
7 Keiper v. Anderson, 138 Minn. 392, 165 N.W. 237 (1917).
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in allowing contract actions under a Wrongful Death Act. 8 The majority
of jurisdictions in the United States, however, have held that actions under
wrongful death acts are limited to those based on tort,9 and that a breach
of contract is not actionable under such statutes.10
If a breach of contract action were to be allowed under the Ohio Wrong-
ful Death Act, 1 it would be subject to certain inherent limitations. There is
a special two-year statute 'of limitations applicable.' 2 Similar provisions
can be found in most wrongful death acts.13 Moreover, the contract theory
could not be used to obtain damages other than those allowed by the
statute itself which are limited to "the pecuniary injury resulting from such
death to the persons, respectively, for whose benefit the action was
brought."14
However, there are numerous benefits which can be derived by a
plaintiff in using a contract theory rather than a tort theory for malpractice
to recover from physicians. 15 A breach of contract action may allow the
use of lay testimony and require less reliance on expert medical testimony
because the contract would state the standard of care which the physician
must meet.16 A physician might also be sued on an implied warranty basis.17
The contract theory would seem to be useful for the same reasons under a
wrongful death act when the patient does not survive. Another use for an
action on a theory of breach of contract is related to the effect of releases.
8 In Calamari v. Mary Immaculate Hosp., supra note 3, it was held that the
administrator of an infant who died in a hospital could base his action for the
hospital's failure to furnish a qualified pediatrician on either contract or tort under
the Wrongful Death Act. See also Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 10 App. Div. 2d 261,
198 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1960); Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1936).
9 See, e.g., Russell v. Sunbury, 37 Ohio St. 372, 41 Am. Rep. 553 (1881); Barley's
Administratrix v. Clover Splint Coal Co., 268 Ky. 218, 150 S.W.2d 670 (1944).
10 Whitely v. Webb's City Inc., 55 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1951). Florida amended its
Wrongful Death Act in 1953 to permit actions ex contractu.
11 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2125.01, 2125.02, 2125.03, and 2125.04 (1953).
12 Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.02 (1953). See Klema v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., 170 Ohio
St. 519, 525, 166 N.E.2d 765, 770 (1960): ". .. But should an action be brought against
a carrier for a claimed breach of contract to safely transport which resulted in death,
such action certainly would be controlled by the wrongful death limitation rather than
the statute of limitations on contracts."
13 See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1959); N.Y. Deced. Est. Law
§ 130.
14 Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.02 (1953). See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, supra note 8;
Steel v. Kurtz, 28 Ohio St. 191 (1876). Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1959)
states that the maximum that may be recovered is $30,000.
15 Belli, Belli Seminar: Trial and Tort Trends 1958, at 55. See Robins v. Finestone,
308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
16 Under an action for malpractice, the standard of care is the amount of care,
knowledge, and skill common to the profession as determined by expert testimony.
17 Belli, op. cit. supra note 16. An example of such a case would be if a doctor
were to tell his patient: "If you take a spinal rather than an inhalation anesthesia, you
will be better off."
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If a plaintiff has released his tort claim, he might still be able to sue if he
is allowed a cause of action based on contract. This would especially be true
in cases involving joint tortfeasors. The general rule is that an unqualified
release, in full satisfaction of a joint or concurrent tortfeasor, releases all
tortfeasors, unless the release contains an express reservation of the right to
sue other tortfeasors.' s In Knight v. Strong,19 it was held that a release of
the initial tortfeasor was a bar to an action of malpractice against the
physician who treated the plaintiff's original injuries. If the release in a
similar action by the beneficiaries under a wrongful death act were con-
strued to apply only to the tort claim, and the administrator or executor
could sue a physician on the basis of an express or implied contract, the
estate might still have its cause of action for breach of contract.
An action based on a contract theory under a wrongful death act may
also be beneficial in the area of warranties. If a thing is made and sold for
a special purpose, there is an implied warranty that it is fit for that purpose.20
The Uniform Commercial Code provides for a warranty that goods are
merchantable which is implied in a sale if the seller is a merchant.21 It has
been held that a suit for wrongful death based on a breach of implied
warranty is within the scope of the wrongful death statutes,2  but if warranty
actions are contractual, such actions would not be available in the majority
of states which still bar contract-based actions under wrongful death acts.23
Suits based upon breach of warranty are well recognized in Ohio. The Ohio
Revised Code lists sales in which a warranty is implied, 24 and a recent Ohio
Supreme Court decision holds that under this section restaurants impliedly
warrant that the food they serve is reasonably fit to eat.2 Rodgers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co.26 has extended the warranty of fitness for preparations
18 Dearhouse v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 118 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ohio 1954);
Connelly v. U.S. Steel Co., 161 Ohio St. 448, 119 N.E.2d 843 (1954).
19 101 Ohio App. 347, 140 N.E.2d 9 (1955).
20 Loxtercamp v. Lininger Implement Co., 147 Iowa 29, 125 N.W. 830 (1910).
21 Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.27 (1953) (Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314).
22 Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., supra note 8. The court held that breach of an
implied warranty that food was fit for consumption was within the terms of the New
York Wrongful Death Act. See also Greenwood v. John R. Thompson Co., 213 Ill.
App. 371 (1919).
23 Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 17 So. 2d 791 (1944); Hinds v.
Wheaden, 115 P.2d 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941), .-ev'd on other grounds, 19 Cal. 2d 458,
121 P.2d 724 (1941).
24 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1302.27, 1302.28, 1302.29 and 1302.30 (1953) (Uniform Com-
mercial Code §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2-316 and 2-317).
25 Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960). For other cases
holding liability for one who prepares food and breaches a warranty of fitness, see
Leonardi v. Haberman Prov. Co., 39 Ohio L. Abs. 253, 52 N.E.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1943),
aff'd, 143 Ohio St. 62, 56 N.E.2d 232 (1943); Yockem v. Gloria Inc., 134 Ohio St. 427,
17 N.E.2d 731 (1938).
26 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958). See also Gander v. Canton Prov. Co.,
130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1934), holding manufacturer and retailer of food in
original container liable for presence of deleterious substance.
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sold in sealed packages. The court held that a warranty exists between the
manufacturer and the ultimate consumer regardless of any direct privity.
In a case where death results, it would be beneficial to plaintiffs to have a
cause of action in contract against the manufacturer under the wrongful
death statutes on the basis of warranty.27
There are several other reasons why a cause of action based on breach
of contract may be useful to plaintiffs. (1) Certain immunities, such as those
protecting municipal corporations, may prevent a recovery in tort, but would
not prevent recovery for breach of contract. 28 (2) A contract claim may be
assignable when a tort claim is not.2 9 The general rule is that a chose in
action is not assignable unless it will survive the holder, 30 and some courts
hold that a cause of action in tort, for injuries purely of a personal nature,
is not assignable.31 The common law will generally recognize assignments of
choses in action arising ex contractu.32 (3) The contract might set a higher
standard of care than the defendant owed the decedent under tort law.33
(4) There is a possibility that the jury will react favorably if they are
shown that defendant had a duty based on a consensual obligation, especially
if an express contract has been breached.
In Ohio, the rule is that actions under the Wrongful Death Act 34 can
only be in tort.35 An Ohio court impressed by the breach of contract theory
could, however, allow recovery under the existing statutes for breach of
contract since the Ohio Wrongful Death Act, like the Illinois Act, employs
the word default.36 However, it seems unlikely that Ohio courts will soon
allow contract actions under Ohio's Wrongful Death Act. In Ohio, actions
against physicians and dentists by patients are actions for malpractice and
not breach of contract.37 The Ohio courts follow the maxim of strictly con-
struing statutes in derogation of the common law while implementing the
purpose of the Act, which in this case is to compensate beneficiaries for
their losses.38 For a death to qualify under the Ohio Wrongful Death Act,
27 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, supra note 8. New York has allowed an action on
breach of implied contract of care against an airline under the Wrongful Death Act.
28 Kerns v. Counch, 141 Ore. 147, 12 P.2d 1011 (1932). See Note, 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 864 (1933).
29 Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 141 P.2d 276 (1943).
30 Lehman v. Farrell, 95 Wis. 185, 70 N.W. 170 (1897).
31 Erickson v. Brookings Co., 3 S.D. 434, 53 N.W. 857 (1892).
32 Park Nat'l Bank v. Globe Indem. Co., 332 Mo. 1089, 61 S.W.2d 733 (1933).
33 Busch v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 187 N.Y. 388, 80 N.E. 197 (1907).
34 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2125.01, 2125.02, 2125.03 and 2125.04 (1953).
35 Russell v. Sunbury, supra note 9. The court, however, would not extend the
opinion to cover the possibility of an action on express contract.
36 Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.01 (1953): "When the death of a person is caused by
wrongful act, neglect or default. .. ."
37 Klema v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., supra note 12.
38 In Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350 (1937), Mr. Justice
Cardozo made this much quoted statement: "Death statutes have their roots in dis-
satisfaction with the archaisms of the law. . . . It would be a misfortune if a narrow
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the defendant must have violated a legal duty to the decedent.39 There is
authority in the United States allowing breach of a duty arising out of a
contract to be actionable as a tort,40 but there would seem to be no valid
reason why the action should not be allowed for the breach of the contract
itself. To do otherwise is to ignore the fact that formalized pleading is no
longer followed, and to deny the public many of the remedies which should
be available to it.
The principal case is illustrative of a trend in the United States toward
increasing liberality in the use of the wrongful death acts, which is the result
of a realization by the courts of the close relationship between tort and
contract. The dictum in the instant case is not likely to be accepted in the
near future, however, in Ohio.
or grudging process of construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to
be remedied."
39 Ford v. Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 107 Ohio St. 100, 140 N.E. 664 (1923).
40 Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., 276 N.Y. 172, 11 N.E.2d 718 (1937); Mueller v.
Winston Bros. Co., 165 Wash. 130, 4 P.2d 854 (1931).
